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Defensive Research, Weaponized: The 2025 State of Pipeline Security
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Defensive Research, Weaponized: The 2025 State of Pipeline Security

TL;DR

2025 didn't give us a new, magical Supply Chain vuln class; instead it gave us attackers who finally started reading our manuals. From Ultralytics' pull_request_target 0-day through Kong, tj-actions, GhostAction, Nx, GlassWorm and both Shai-Hulud waves, the common pattern wasn't typosquats but Pipeline Parasitism: living off CI/CD, maintainer accounts and developer endpoints using the same tools and patterns we published to defend them. The vuln mechanics stayed boring: shell injections and over-privileged tokens. But they were operationalized with worms, invisible Unicode payloads, blockchain C2, and even wiper failsafes. Thankfully, platforms are finally improving, yet "pwn request" is here to stay; the only sustainable answer is to treat pipelines as production systems and publish future research assuming adversaries are our most diligent readers!

--author "François Proulx" | --date 2025-12-08 | --read-time 21 min
#supply-chain#security
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Don't Go with the flaw
research

Don't Go with the flaw

TL;DR

Malicious code caching, dangling commits, pseudo-versions stealthily pointing to backdoors... Go makes you just as vulnerable as other ecosystems to social engineering attacks, and can even help malicious actors cover their tracks. Go enables new manipulation techniques to subtly trick users into downloading malicious packages. In this article, we describe various attack vectors in the Go ecosystem, from social engineering to well-known attacks such as repojacking, domain hijacking, and dependency confusion. Go's ecosystem guarantees integrity, not trust.

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MessyPoutine CTF

Learn pipeline exploitation hands-on. Pwn requests, LOTP techniques, confused deputies — all the gravy.

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